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Abstract 
 
In this paper we present estimates of Korean bank inefficiency and productivity change 
for the period 1992 to 2002 that are derived from the directional technology distance 
function.  Our method controls for loan losses that are an undesirable by-product that 
arise from producing loans and allows the aggregation of individual bank inefficiency 
and productivity growth to the industry level.  We find indicate that technical progress 
during the period was more than enough to offset efficiency declines so that the banking 
industry experienced productivity growth.   
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1.  Introduction 
 
 In this paper we investigate the effects of Korean financial liberalization and the 
Asian financial crisis on the efficiency and productivity growth of the Korean banking 
industry during the 1990s and early 2000s.  Korea has played an important role in the 
financial sector of northeast Asia and as the Korean government recently implemented an 
ambitious plan to develop Korea as a financial hub for the region, it is worthwhile and 
timely to analyze the Korean banking industry’s efficiency and productivity.    
In measuring bank efficiency and productivity growth, we address certain 
empirical problems that have been encountered in bank efficiency studies.  First, 
measures of technical efficiency estimated using Shephard (1974) output or input 
distance functions are not additive from the bank to the industry level.  Thus, estimates of 
mean bank efficiency and its change over time provide minimal insight into industry 
performance.  To address this problem, we use the directional technology distance 
function, which can be aggregated to an industry measure of performance. (Färe and 
Primont 2003, Färe and Grosskopf 2004)    Second, the fact that some bank loans become 
non-performing and are eventually written off requires an efficiency measure that can 
account for both desirable outputs, such as bank loans and security investments, and 
undesirable by-products, such as non-performing loans.  Again, the directional 
technology distance function is capable of modeling efficiency for firms that produce 
desirable outputs and undesirable outputs.    
Given our panel data set consisting of between fourteen and twenty-six banks for 
the period 1992-2002, we also measure productivity growth and its decomposition into 
growth due to greater efficiency and growth due to technical change. These indicators of 
productivity growth can also be aggregated to the industry level.  Many studies of firm 
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productivity growth yield estimates of technical regress from period to period.  The 
measured technical regress is usually thought to be an artifact of the method that defines 
the frontier.  For example, when data envelopment analysis (DEA) is used to construct 
the production frontier, firms that exhibit the best-practice output-input combination 
define the frontier in a given period and are technically efficient.  If those same firms 
produce less output or use more input in a subsequent period but still define the frontier, 
the inward shift of the frontier is denoted as technical regress, when it more logically 
could be deemed lower efficiency.   In their examination of labor productivity growth 
across countries, Kumar and Russell (2002) measure technical regress for some countries 
that have low capital-labor ratios and write that the results:  
should be taken with a grain of salt.  For one thing, it is not clear how the 
world frontier could implode at some capital-labor ratios.  Does 
knowledge decay?  Were "blueprints" lost?  It is perhaps more likely that 
the “best-practice” frontier constructed by the DEA technique is well 
below the "true" but unobservable frontier at very low capital-labor ratios 
and therefore that the apparent technological degradation at these low 
levels of capitalization are in fact efficiency declines.  (Kumar and Russell 
2002, p. 540) 
 
We address this problem in our model by specifying a current period technology that 
depends on current observations of inputs and outputs and the input-output combinations 
from all preceding periods using sequential reference sets (Tulkens and Eeckaut, 1995).  
Specifying the production technology in this manner means that our method will rule out 
technical regress as a source of productivity decline.  Instead, should productivity 
declines occur, our method will assign those declines as arising from less efficiency.    
However, our method still does not measure efficiency relative to the true, but 
unobservable technology, but instead constructs the technology given the best-practice 
techniques of observed banks. 
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In the next section we provide a brief history of the Korean banking industry, 
including the various regulations faced by Korean banks and subsequent financial 
liberalization, the events that occurred prior to the Asian financial crisis, and subsequent 
post-crisis reforms.  Section 3 reviews previous studies of Korean bank efficiency.  In 
section 4 we present the method used to estimate efficiency and productivity growth.  In 
section 5 we describe the data and estimates of Korean bank industry efficiency and 
productivity growth.  In the final section we offer a summary of our work and draw 
conclusions.      
2. The Korean Banking Industry: Regulation, Liberalization, Crisis, 
and Recovery 
 
Since the 1960s, growth of the Korean banking sector coincides with rapid growth 
in the Korean economy.   In fact, for the last twenty years Korean bank assets grew faster 
than the economy, with annual growth of 22%, compared to annual nominal GDP growth 
of 14%.  During this period the Korean banking sector underwent many changes 
including nationalization, privatization, re-nationalization, re-privatization, financial 
liberalization, financial crisis, and, most recently, restructuring.  Since these changes will 
likely impact the efficiency and productivity growth of Korean banks, we examine them 
here. 
A few modern commercial banks were established in Korea during the Japanese 
occupation (1910-1945) and Korea inherited these banks when the Japanese colonial rule 
ended in 1945.  After independence, the Korean government passed two important pieces 
of banking legislation in 1950: the Bank of Korea Act, which created the central bank, 
and the General Bank Act, which regulated privately held commercial banks.  The 
General Bank Act of 1950 laid a foundation of sound banking guidelines.  However, after 
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the Korean War of 1950-1953, banks were nationalized as the government mobilized 
scarce financial resources for reconstruction and redevelopment of devastated industries.  
The establishment of a new regime by free election in 1960 resulted in a brief period of 
privatization and autonomy in management.  However, a military coup in 1961 and the 
subsequent regime led by President Park reversed the course of privatization.     
After the 1961 coup, five nationwide commercial banks were nationalized, which 
allowed the government to provide financing to targeted industries under a series of five-
year plans.  Import substitution industries were the first to be targeted, followed by export 
promotion industries, and then heavy and chemical industries.  Several specialized banks 
were also established in the early 1960s to be operated outside of the central bank’s 
authority and to finance government-targeted priority industries.  Regional banks were 
introduced in the late 1960s to stimulate regional economic development.  Within a few 
years, ten regional banks were established and remained in business until the Korean 
financial and currency crisis of 1997-1998.  After the crisis, four regional banks were 
closed or merged with nationwide banks.   
Commercial banks were the main instrument for carrying out government-
initiated economic development plans during the 1960s and 1970s. The proportion of 
policy loans to domestic credit increased from 40% in the 1960s to 50% in the 1970s.  It 
was during this period, particularly the 1970s, that Korean conglomerates or Chaebols 
were formed and given government protection.  In order to promote heavy and chemical 
industries, proven entrepreneurs were asked to invest in targeted industries with 
government financial support in the form of subsidized loans at negative real interest 
rates, easy access to foreign exchanges, and tax concessions.      
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With inefficient banks facing financial difficulties and competition from an 
underground financial market, the Korean government introduced a series of reforms 
beginning with revisions to The General Banking Act in 1982.  These revisions ushered 
in a period of gradual privatization and bank deregulation.  Merchant banks and short-
term finance firms were created to attract credit into the formal market.  Moreover, 
nationwide commercial banks increased from five in 1980, to ten in 1990, to fourteen in 
1993.  While the intent of the regulatory reforms was to refocus government on the 
control of monetary aggregates, government continued to indirectly allocate credit 
through its influence on the appointment of top bank managers.   
In response to pressure from the OECD and the US to open its financial markets, 
Korea began a series of revisions to the General Banking Act during 1991 to 1997.  
Interest rates were deregulated, policy loans and other credit controls were eliminated, 
reductions in non-performing loans were targeted, foreign exchange market transactions 
were deregulated, and bank ownership was restructured to allow individual shareholders 
up to a 12% equity stake.     
The 1991 to 1997 reforms allowed Korean firms easier access to foreign capital 
without government approval and supervision, a fact that some observers attribute as a 
major cause of the Korean currency crisis of 1997-1998.   Furthermore, a long period of 
recession and low domestic interest rates in Japan led to an influx of foreign capital to 
Asian countries.  Contributing to the over-lending to Korean banks and firms was a moral 
hazard effect, as foreign lenders perceived explicit or implicit loan guarantees.  A lack of 
appropriate supervision and regulation also allowed serious asset-liability mismatches to 
develop as long-term domestic loans were financed through short-term foreign 
borrowing, with short-term foreign debt accounting for up to 65% of total foreign debt.  
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Similar mismatches in the duration of loans and deposits caused the Savings and Loan 
Association Crisis of the 1980s in the US (Saunders, 2000). 
The excessive borrowing by Korean banks financed investment in tradable goods 
by Chaebols, causing overcapacity in sectors such as automobiles and micro-chips, 
resulting in low profits and subsequent bad loans.  According to Corsetti, Pesenti and 
Roubini (1999), evidence of risky overinvestment was seen in the high rate of non-
performing loans and high leverage ratios of the corporate sector in the Asian countries 
that experienced the currency crisis.   As non-performing loans increased, foreign 
creditors became less willing to refinance, igniting speculative attacks.  In Korea, non-
performing loans as a share of total loans reached 16% in June 1997 and then 22.5% in 
the first quarter of 1998 (Park, 2003). 
The financial crisis of 1997-1998 brought about a significant transformation in the 
banking sector in Korea as the government carried out a two-stage financial restructuring.  
In the first stage, two banks were nationalized for later sale to foreigners, five insolvent 
banks were closed and then merged with blue-chip banks, inducements for foreign capital 
injections were given to seven banks, and public funds were used to normalize operations 
at the remaining surviving banks.  Korean banks responded with cost reductions and the 
fastest disposal rate of non-performing loans among the Asian countries suffering the 
currency crisis.    
The second stage of restructuring began in June 2000 and focused on restoring 
bank profitability.  Financial holding companies were created to make merger and 
acquisition easier and help banks realize scale economies.  Although bank concentration 
increased as nationwide banks gained market share in deposits and loans at the expense 
of regional banks, a study by the IMF (2001) found that Korean bank concentration was 
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still low relative to OECD countries.  The reforms also promoted market accounting 
methods, loan loss provisioning rules, and required equity capital injections into those 
banks affected by the recognition of loan losses. As a consequence of the equity capital 
injections, government ownership increased from less than 18% of total bank capital to 
over 56% of total bank capital. Foreign ownership of banks also increased to about 30% 
of Korean bank assets as foreign equity capital limits were eliminated.   
Although Korean banks are more focused on profitability, the government is still 
indirectly engaged in credit allocation.  Loan portfolios have shifted away from corporate 
loans toward household loans in response to government stimulants to domestic 
consumption to compensate for lower exports.  Government stimulants include easing 
entry requirements into the credit card business, inducements to credit card companies to 
lower service fees for cash withdrawal, and to allow no-interest installment payments.   
Increased bank competition for household loans accompanied by easy financing resulted 
in high default rates of consumer and credit-card debts in 2003.  Today, Korean bank 
profitability remains poor, due to a high share of nonperforming loans and inefficient 
pricing of credit risk.  However, after four years of negative rates of return on assets and 
equity stemming from the crisis, both measures of profitability turned positive in 2001 
and 2002.    
3.  Review of Previous Studies on Korean Bank Efficiency 
Gilbert and Wilson (1998) investigate the effects of privatization and deregulation 
on the productivity of fourteen nationwide and ten regional Korean banks for the period 
1980-1994.    They find that Korean banks dramatically changed their mix of inputs and 
outputs as privatization and deregulation occurred during the 1980s and early 1990s. 
Using Malmquist indexes, they decompose productivity change into technical efficiency 
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change and technological change and find that privatization and deregulation enhanced 
potential output as well as productivity among Korean banks.    
Hao, Hunter, and Yang (2001) extend the analysis of Gilbert and Wilson (1998) 
to identify the key determinants of the efficiency gains.  Using a stochastic cost frontier 
approach, they compute efficiency scores for a sample of nine nationwide banks and ten 
regional banks for the period 1985-1995.  They find that banks with higher rates of asset 
growth, fewer employees per million won of assets, larger amounts of core deposits, 
lower expense ratios, and classification as a nationwide bank are more efficient.  
However, Hao, Hunter, and Yang find that the financial deregulation of 1991 had little or 
no significant effect on bank efficiency. 
Extending the time frame of Gilbert and Wilson, Lee and Kwon (1999) find that 
financial liberalization in the 1990s helped enhance input technical efficiency of 
nationwide banks leading to a 2.7% annual productivity growth, while regional banks 
experienced declines in efficiency resulting in a 1% decline in productivity.  Cho and 
Shin (2004) find that the five biggest Korean banks experienced a decline in rates of 
return during 1992-1997 relative to other Korean banks, although these big banks 
maintained greater cost and technical efficiency.  Park and Kim (2002) estimated 
efficiency and productivity change for the period 1995-2000 and found that regional 
banks are less efficient and experience fewer gains in efficiency than nationwide banks.  
Park and Yi (2002) use data from the period 1995 to 1999 to estimate efficiency and 
simulate the effects of various hypothetical merger scenarios.  They found evidence of 
decreasing returns to scale for mergers of two technically efficient banks, but if those 
same two banks produce different mixes of outputs, strong scope economies might arise 
via the merger.  
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 4. Method - The Directional Output Distance Function 
We use the directional technology distance function to model the production 
process of Korean banks.  This directional distance function allows efficiency to be 
measured for firms that face a technology where both desirable outputs and undesirable 
outputs are produced.  This function has been used in measuring the efficiency of firms or 
industries that generate polluting by-products in addition to desirable outputs.  (Chung, 
Färe, and Grosskopf 1997, Färe et al. 2005, Yu 2004)  For our purpose it is a useful tool 
for measuring the efficiency of banks that produce non-performing loans as a by-product 
of their loan portfolio.   Similar models were also considered by Charnes et al. (1985) in a 
DEA setting.  However, while the Charnes et al. additive DEA model yields an efficiency 
measure obtained by minimizing the slack in the output and input constraints, the 
directional distance function evaluates the inefficiency of a bank for a pre-specified 
direction to the frontier of the technology.  Furthermore, the directional distance function 
can be estimated using nonparametric DEA methods as we do here, or using stochastic 
parametric methods.     
Let My R+∈  denote a vector of desirable outputs, Jb R+∈  denote a vector of 
undesirable outputs, and Nx R+∈  denote a vector of inputs.  Production takes place in 
t=1,…,T periods by k=1,…,K banks.  An observation on bank k in period t is represented 
by ( , , )t t tk k kx y b .    
The technology, T, is the set of desirable outputs, undesirable outputs, and inputs 
such that the inputs can produce the outputs: 
 .          (1) {( , , ) :  can produce ( , )}T x y b x y b=
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We assume the technology is convex, compact, and satisfies the condition of no free 
lunch.  We also assume the technology satisfies strong disposability (SD) of desirable 
outputs and inputs, weak disposability (WD) of desirable and undesirable outputs and 
inputs, and null-jointness (NJ).  These properties are represented as: 
If ( , , )  and ( ', ', ) ( , , ) then ( ', ', )
If ( , , )  then ( , , )  for 0 1
If ( , , )  and 0 then 0.
SD x y b T x y b x y b x y b T
WD x y b T x y b T
NJ x y b T b y
θ θ θ θ
∈ − ≤ −
∈ ∈ ≤ ≤
∈ = =
∈
      (2) 
Strong disposability implies that banks can use more input to produce the same 
amount of desirable and undesirable outputs, or, it can produce fewer desirable outputs 
and the same amount of undesirable outputs from a given level of inputs.  However, SD 
is not a maintained assumption for the undesirable output, since there is an opportunity 
cost of disposing of undesirable outputs.  Instead, we assume that desirable and 
undesirable outputs are weakly disposable.  The assumption of weak disposability models 
the idea that there is a cost to reducing undesirable outputs. If banks want to reduce their 
non-performing loans, they must make fewer total loans.  The property of no free lunch 
implies that if no input is available, no output can be produced. 
We use data envelopment analysis (DEA) to represent the technology.  The piece-
wise linear constant returns to scale DEA technology for period j is usually written as 
1 1 1
{( , , ) : , , , 0, 1,..., }
K K K
j j j j j j j j
k k k k k k k
k k k
T x y b z x x z y y z b b z k K
= = =
= ≤ ≥ = ≥ =∑ ∑ ∑ .        
To address the concern of Kumar and Russell (2002) we modify the technology so that 
combinations of inputs that could produce the desirable and undesirable outputs in 
previous periods are feasible in the current period.  The modified technology takes the 
form: 
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1 1 1 1 1 1
{( , , ) : , , ,
0, 1,..., , 1,..., }
j j jK K K
j t t t t
k k k k k k
t k t k t k
t
k
T x y b z x x z y y z b
z k K t j
= = = = = =
= ≤ ≥
≥ = =
∑∑ ∑∑ ∑∑ t t b=
∈
∈
                    (3) 
The best-practice technology is constructed from observations on all K banks in the 
current period, j, and each of the preceding periods, t<j,  and is such that no less input can 
be used to produce no more desirable output and an equal amount of the undesirable 
output than a linear combination of observed inputs, desirable outputs, and undesirable 
outputs.  The intensity variables, , serve to form linear combinations of observations 
from the current and past periods.  Constant returns to scale are imposed by constraining 
the intensity variables to be non-negative.  
t
kz
 So that we might illustrate the technology in two-dimensional diagrams, we 
introduce three other sets that are equivalent representations of the technology.  For ease 
of exposition we drop the time superscript temporarily.  Holding undesirable outputs 
constant, the set V(b) gives the set of feasible input-desirable output combinations:  
( ) {( , ) : ( , , ) }V b x y x y b T= .                             (4) 
The output possibility set P(x), gives the set of desirable and undesirable outputs that can 
be produced from a given level of inputs: 
( ) {( , ) : ( , , ) }.P x y b x y b T=                               (5) 
Finally, the desirable output requirement set is the set of inputs and undesirable outputs 
that are feasible given desirable outputs: 
( ) {( , ) : ( , , ) }.L y x b x y b T= ∈                                 (6) 
The three technology sets are depicted in Figure 1.  Each set is bounded.  For the 
set V(b), the horizontal extension to the east indicates that there is an upper bound on the 
amount of desirable output, y, that can be produced from input, x, given undesirable 
  11
output b.  For the output set P(x), finite amounts of input can only yield finite amounts of 
desirable and undesirable outputs.  For the set L(y), there is a lower bound on the amount 
of undesirable output produced and input used given an amount of desirable output.  We 
also note that the pseudo-isoquant for V(y) can be backward bending because the 
undesirable output satisfies only weak disposability.  Given the technology represented 
by the sets in Figure 1, suppose we observe a bank, represented by point A.  Clearly bank 
A produces off the frontier of the technology set and is inefficient.  That is, bank A 
should be able to use less input and produce more desirable output and less undesirable 
output given the technology.   To measure inefficiency we use the directional technology 
distance function proposed by Chambers, Chung, and Färe (1996) as a generalization of 
the Luenberger (1992) benefit function.  Let ( , , )x y bg g g g=  represent a directional 
vector.  The directional technology distance function seeks the maximum simultaneous 
expansion of desirable outputs, contraction of undesirable outputs, and contraction of 
inputs for the directional vector, g.  This function takes the form: 
( , , ; , , ) max{ : ( , , ) }T x y b x y bD x y b g g g x g y g b g Tβ β β β
→ = − + − ∈ .    (7)      
Adding back the time superscript, the directional technology distance function for 
bank A in period j is estimated via DEA as: 
1 1
1 1 1 1
( , , ; , , ) max{ : ,
, , 0, 1,..., , 1,..., }.
j j K
t t j
T x y b k k A x
t k
j jK K
t t j t t j t
k k A y k k A b k
t k t k
D x y b g g g z x x g
z y y g z b b g z k K t j
β β
β β
→
= =
= = = =
= ≤ −
≥ + = − ≥ = =
∑∑
∑∑ ∑∑
  (8) 
Suppose we take the directional vector to be ( , , ) (1,1,1)x y bg g g g= = .  For this directional 
vector, the solution to (8) gives the maximum unit expansion in desirable output and 
simultaneous unit contraction in undesirable outputs and inputs that is feasible given the 
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technology.  Other directional vectors can also be chosen.  A directional vector such as 
g=(x,0,0) would give the percentage contraction in inputs, holding outputs fixed.  A 
direction such as g=(0,y,b) would give the percentage expansion in desirable output and 
contraction in undesirable output, given inputs.  
In Figure 1 we illustrate the movement of an observation such as bank A, with 
coordinates ( , , )A A Ax y b , toward the frontier of each set given the value of the directional 
distance function, β*.   The frontier coordinates of bank A are 
( * , * , * )A x y bx g y g b gβ β β− + − .   Banks that produce on the frontier are efficient and 
with . Values of  indicate inefficiency 
for the g-directional vector. 
( , , ; , , ) 0T x y bD x y b g g g
→ = ( , , ; , , ) 0T x y bD x y b g g g
→ >
The directional technology distance function is a generalization of Shephard 
output or input distance functions.   Shephard's input distance function is defined as 
( , , ) max{ : ( )}i
xD y b x L yλ λ= ∈ .                                               (9) 
The Shephard input distance function seeks the maximum proportional contraction of 
inputs that can still produce the output vector (y,b) and can be derived from the 
directional distance function by setting ( ,0,0)g x= .  That is,  
1( , , ; ,0,0) 1
( , , )T i
D x y b x
D y b x
= −r .                                                            (10) 
Shephard's output distance function is defined as 
( , )( , , ) min{ : ( )o
y bD x y b P xδ δ= ∈ .                                                            (11) 
The reciprocal of the output distance function yields the proportional expansion in 
desirable outputs and undesirable outputs that is feasible given inputs.  The output 
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distance function can be obtained from the directional distance function by setting 
: (0, , )g y= −b
1( , , ;0, , ) 1
( , , )T o
D x y b y b
D x y b
− = −r .                                                            (12) 
We note that we take a negative direction for the undesirable output since our definition 
in (7) subtracts bgβ  in computing the directional distance function.   While the Shephard 
output distance function can be used to measure bank efficiency, bank managers are 
generally not interested in maximizing desirable and undesirable outputs simultaneously.  
Instead, bank managers seek to expand desirable outputs and contract undesirable 
outputs, such as non-performing loans, providing the rationale for our use of the 
directional distance function.  
When all banks are evaluated for a common direction, Färe and Grosskopf (2004) 
show that an industry measure of inefficiency can be obtained as the sum the directional 
distance functions for the firms in the industry.  Although Shephard output or input 
distance functions can be derived from the directional distance function, these Shephard 
distance functions use firm specific directional vectors and cannot be aggregated to the 
industry level.  Devaney and Weber (2002) estimate US bank efficiency using the 
directional distance function, but do not account for non-performing loans and their 
choice of directional vector does not allow for consistent aggregation to an industry 
efficiency measure.  Fukuyama and Weber (2004) provide an example of the aggregation 
property of directional distance functions for Japanese banks, but do not account for non-
performing loans.   
To measure productivity growth, the directional distance function must be 
evaluated in different periods.  Caves, Christensen, and Diewert (1982) develop a 
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Malmquist index, equal to the ratio of two Shephard distance functions, to measure total 
factor productivity growth.   Extending the work of Caves et al. by accounting for 
undesirable outputs Chung, Färe, and Grosskopf (1997) and Weber and Domazlicky 
(2001) define a productivity change index equal to the geometric mean of two Malmquist 
indexes and decompose productivity change into the product of an index of efficiency 
change and an index of technical change.  Given the additive nature of the Luenberger 
directional technology distance function, productivity change is more naturally 
decomposed into additive indicators of efficiency change and technical change.  Färe and 
Grosskopf (2004) derive additive Luenberger productivity indicators.  They use the term 
"indicator" to denote the difference in two efficiency measures, rather than "index," 
which commonly refers to the ratio of two efficiency measures.   We follow Färe and 
Grosskopf and evaluate the directional distance function in period j and period j+1 to 
measure efficiency change.  We also estimate how far an observation ( , , )j j jx y b  is from 
the period j+1 frontier, and how far an observation  is from the period j 
frontier, so that we can estimate technical change.  The efficiency change component 
measures “catching up” to the frontier and the technical change component measures the 
shift in the frontier from period to period.  The two inter-period directional distance 
functions are estimated as: 
1 1 1( , ,j j jx y b+ + + )
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1 1 1
( , , ; , , ) max{ : ,
, , 0, 1,..., , 1,..., 1}
j j K
j j j t t j
T x y b k k A x
t k
j jK K
t t j t t j t
k k A y k k A b k
t k t k
D x y b g g g z x x g
z y y g z b b g z k K t j
β β
β β
+ +→
= =
+ +
= = = =
= ≤ −
≥ + = − ≥ = = +
∑∑
∑∑ ∑∑
        (13) 
and 
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1 1 1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1 1 1
( , , ; , , ) max{ : ,
, , 0, 1,..., , 1,..., }.
j j K
j j j t t j
T x y b k k A x
t k
j jK K
t t j t t j t
k k A y k k A b k
t k t k
D x y b g g g z x x g
z y y g z b b g z k K t j
β β
β β
→ + + + +
= =
+ +
= = = =
= ≤ −
≥ + = − ≥ = =
∑∑
∑∑ ∑∑
           (14) 
Problem (13) estimates how far the period t observations on inputs and outputs are from 
the period j+1 technological frontier.  Problem (14) estimates how far the period j+1 
observations on inputs and outputs are from the period t technological frontier.   
The Luenberger productivity indicator is 
1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1
1( , , , , , ; , , ) ( , , ; , , ) ( , , ; , , )
2
( , , ; , , ) ( , , ; , , ) 15
{
}. ( )
j j
j j j j j j j j j j j j
T Tx y b x y b x y b
j j
j j j j j j
T Tx y b x y b
L x y b x y b g g g D x y b g g g D x y b g g g
D x y b g g g D x y b g g g
+ +→ →+ + + + + +
→ → + + +
= −
+ −
The Luenberger productivity indicator can be decomposed into the sum of an indicator of 
efficiency change, EFFCH, and an indicator of technical change, TECH.  These 
indicators take the form 
1
1 1 1( , , ; , , ) ( , , ; , , )
j j
j j j j j j
T Tx y b x y bEFFCH D x y b g g g D x y b g g g
+→ → + + += −  and                   (16) 
1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1{ ( , , ; , , ) ( , , ; , ,
2
( , , ; , , ) ( , , ; , , )}
j j
j j j j j j
T Tx y b x y b
j j
j j j j j j
T Tx y b x y b
TECH D x y b g g g D x y b g g g
D x y b g g g D x y b g g g
+ +→ → + + +
→ → + + +
= +
− −
)
                       (17) 
where .  Values of the indicators 
greater than zero indicate productivity growth, greater efficiency, or technical progress.   
Values of the indicators less than zero indicate a decline in productivity, less efficiency, 
or technical regress.   
1 1 1( , , , , , ; , , )j j j j j j x y bL x y b x y b g g g EFFCH TECH
+ + + = +
5. Data and Empirical Estimates 
 The data we use to estimate efficiency and productivity change are from the 
financial statements of Korean banks during the period 1992-2002, compiled by the 
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Korea Financial Supervisory Service, and the Bank Management Statistics of the Bank of 
Korea.  The names of the nationwide and regional banks are included in Appendix A.   
We confine our analysis to banks that report positive equity capital and positive amounts 
of non-performing loans in a year.  A loan is defined as non-performing if no payment 
has been received by the bank in the past ninety days or if the borrower has declared 
bankruptcy.  While several new banks opened in the latter part of the period, they report 
zero amounts of non-performing loans in their first year of operation.  In subsequent 
periods the non-performing loans of these banks are positive, and we include them in our 
analysis.  The Korean banking industry consists of twenty-four banks in 1992-1994 and 
grows to twenty-five in 1995 and 1996, and to twenty-six in 1997.  The financial crisis of 
1997-1998 brought about a significant transformation of the Korean banking industry 
which we describe in section 2.  In 1998 two new banks join twenty surviving banks, but 
by 1999 and 2000 only seventeen banks remain in operation, declining to fifteen in 2001 
and fourteen in 2002.  
 Berger and Humphrey (1992, 1997) provide a review of financial institution 
efficiency studies and the various methods used to define inputs and outputs in financial 
services.  The asset approach defines loans and other assets as outputs, while deposits, 
other liabilities, labor and physical capital are treated as inputs.  The value-added 
approach defines outputs as those assets and liabilities that add substantial value to the 
bank and includes labor and the value of premises and fixed assets (physical capital) as 
inputs.  The user-cost approach of Hancock (1985) defines outputs as those assets or 
liabilities that contribute to a bank's revenues and defines inputs as labor and those assets 
or liabilities that contribute to a bank's cost of production.  Tortosa-Ausina (2002) finds 
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significant differences in measured bank efficiency for the asset approach and a variant of 
the value-added approach.    
Banks also engage in various off-balance sheet activities such as buying and 
selling interest rate options or foreign exchange options and making loan commitments 
that generate fee income and contingent obligations.  Berger and Mester (1997) include 
the credit equivalent amount of off-balance sheet activity as a fixed netput that impacts 
bank profitability.   Rogers (1998) includes fee income as a non-priced output to proxy 
off-balance sheet activity in his model of US commercial bank profit efficiency.  He finds 
that models ignoring off-balance sheet activity understate bank efficiency.   
Banks also operate in a regulatory environment which requires them to maintain 
minimum amounts of equity capital. In deciding the appropriate output-input mix, bank 
managers must account for the risk-return preferences of bank owners.  Some bank 
managers might choose to employ larger amounts of labor to monitor risky loans and 
investments to preserve equity capital.  Other bank managers might use less labor, 
resulting in lower costs, but greater risk.  Färe, Grosskopf, and Weber (2004) test for the 
effects of bank regulatory requirements and the risk-return tradeoff on bank profit 
efficiency and find that using bank equity capital as a quasi-fixed input is sufficient to 
account for both risk-based capital requirements and the risk-return tradeoff that bank 
owners face.  We follow the work of  Färe, Grosskopf, and Weber (2004) and add an 
equity capital constraint to our DEA estimate of the directional distance function in (8) 
and the mixed period problems given in (13) and (14).  This equity capital (eq) constraint 
is .   
1 1
j K
t t j
k k A
t k
z eq eq
= =
≤∑∑
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Given the sensitivity of efficiency estimates to output and input specification we 
estimate five alternative models.  In Model 1, we assume that Korean banks produce 
three desirable outputs and one undesirable output, using three variable inputs and one 
fixed input.  The desirable outputs are commercial loans (y1), personal loans (y2), and 
securities (y3).  The undesirable output (b1) is non-performing loans.  The three variable 
inputs are full-time labor (x1), physical capital which is measured as the asset value of 
premises and fixed assets (x2), and total deposits (x3).   In Model 2 we follow Rogers 
(1998) and include fee income (y9) as an additional output.   In Model 3 we follow 
Tortosa-Ausina (2002) and include demand deposits (y4) along with the outputs from 
Model 2.  The output specification for Model 3 is also similar to that of Hao et al. (2001) 
in their estimation of a cost function for Korean banks.     
Models 1, 2, and 3 the same inputs (x1, x2, x3) are used to produce non-performing 
loans and various desirable outputs.  The DEA technology defined by (3) depends on the 
number of input and output constraints.  A consequence of increasing the number of 
desirable outputs as we move from Model 1 to Model 3 is that the technology, T, 
becomes more constrained and thus, measured inefficiency will not increase.   
 Two other output-input specifications are also considered.  The previously noted 
argument of Park and Yi (2002) suggests that deposits are not an appropriate input.  For 
this reason and for further comparison we consider two other output-input specifications. 
In Model 4, we follow the work of Hunter and Timme (1986) and define outputs as 
securities investments (y3), total loans less non-performing loans (y5=y1+y2-b1), total 
deposits (y6) and fee income (y9).  Model 4 inputs include labor (x1) and physical capital 
(x2).  In Model 5 we follow the work of Sturm and Williams (2004) and assume that 
interest income (y7) and non-interest income (y8) are produced from interest expense (x4) 
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and non-interest expense (x5).  After the crisis, the number of part-time and contractual 
workers increased relative to full-time labor as banks tried to reduce costs.  In 1992, less 
than 3% of total workers were part-time.  This average increased to 5% in 1995, 11% in 
1996 and 1997, and to over 20% during 1999-2000.  Unfortunately, our data do not 
provide the number of hours worked for these part-time and contractual workers.  
However, the expenses for these workers are included in non-interest expenses in Model 
5 and will provide a comparison with the estimates of Models 1-4.    
 Descriptive statistics on each of the outputs and inputs for our pooled sample of 
229 banks are provided in Table 1.  We deflate the desirable outputs, non-performing 
loans, value of physical capital, deposits, financial equity capital, interest income, non-
interest income, interest expense, and non-interest expense by the Korean GDP deflator 
in each year.  Labor is measured as the number of full-time employed workers, and the 
other inputs and all outputs are in 100 million Korean won.  As a percent of total bank 
assets, commercial loans (y1) average 33.5% in the years 1992-96 before the financial 
crisis, but only 27% of total assets in the years 1999-2000 following the crisis.  Personal 
loans (y2) and securities (y3) grow from an average of 5% and 16% of total assets in the 
years before the crisis, to 14% and 26% in the years following the crisis.  Non-
performing loans (b1) average 3.6% of assets in the years before the crisis, grow to 6.4% 
of total assets in the crisis years of 1997 and 1998, and then fall to 3.6% of assets in the 
years following the crisis.  Financial equity capital as a percent of assets is 10% in the 
pre-crisis years, 4.5% of assets in the two-year crisis period, and 4.9% of assets in the 
post-crisis years.  Net income equals the difference between the output and inputs of 
Model 4 (y7+y8-x3-x4), is positive, but decreasing during 1992-1996, is negative during 
1997-2000 reaching a low in 1998, and then is positive in 2001-2002.  As a percent of 
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equity capital, net income averages between 4% and 7% during 1992-1996 and is about 
12% percent during 2001-2002.  During 1997-2000 banks incur a negative return on 
equity which reaches five times the level of equity capital in 1998.  Fees (y9) average 6% 
of the sum of interest income and non-interest income.  Banks employ an average of 4094 
full-time workers, use physical capital equal to 6457 x100 million Korean won, and use 
119,851 x 100 million won in deposits to produce the outputs.   
 To estimate the directional technology distance function and productivity change, 
a directional vector must be chosen.  We consider three alternative directional vectors.  In 
the first case, we choose a directional vector that equals to the mean output-input values 
as reported in Table 1.  That is, we take  .  For instance, in Model 1, with 
three inputs, three desirable outputs, and nonperforming loans, 
_ _ _
( , , )g x y b=
1 2 3 1 2 3 1( , , , , , , )g x x x y y y b= =(4094, 6457, 119851, 43472, 18882, 34939, 7049).    In the 
second case, we choose a directional vector equal to  (0, , )g y b= .  For this second case 
we hold input constant and estimate the maximum simultaneous expansion in desirable 
output and contraction in undesirable output.  For our third case, we choose a directional 
vector equal to ( ,0,0)g x= .  Here, we hold desirable and undesirable outputs constant 
and estimate the maximum contraction inputs.  
To interpret the results, consider the estimates for the directional 
vector ( , , )g x y b= .  For this directional vector, suppose that a bank has measured 
inefficiency of .   The directional distance function gives the 
expansion in desirable outputs, contraction in undesirable outputs, and simultaneous 
contraction in inputs multiplied by the directional vector.  Thus, if this hypothetical bank 
( , , ; , , ) 0.02T x y bD x y b g g g
→ =
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were to operate efficiently on the frontier of the T, it could expand commercial loans by 
0.02 x 43472=869, expand personal loans by 0.02 x 18882=378, expand securities by 
0.02 x =34939=699, contract non-performing loans by 0.02 x 7049=141, while using 0.02 
x 4094=82 fewer workers, 0.02 x 6457=129 less in physical capital, and 0.02 x 119851= 
2397 fewer deposits.   
 Banks with an estimate of ( , , ; , , ) 0T x y bD x y b g g g
→ =  are efficient and produce on 
the frontier.  Table 2 reports the number of banks that define the frontier in each year for 
each model and divides the number of frontier banks into national banks and regional 
banks.  National banks are large, have offices throughout the country, and tend to have 
more diversified loan portfolios than regional banks.  For Models 1, 2, and 3 the number 
of frontier banks declines from 1992 until 1998.  A higher percentage of regional banks 
are on the frontier during 1992-1995, but by 1996 and especially in 1998, a lower 
percentage of regional banks are on the frontier.  During 1999-2001 the number of 
frontier banks increase, but then fall in 2002.  For Models 4 and 5 a smaller number of 
banks define the frontier.  For Model 4, a higher percent of percent of nationwide banks 
are on the frontier while for Model 5, a higher percent of regional banks produce on the 
frontier in the early part of the period and in 2002.  The difference in the number of 
frontier banks for Model 4 versus Models 1, 2, and 3 is partially explained by the 
treatment of total deposits, which are an input in the first three models and an output in 
Model 4.  Banks that are successful in minimizing the input of deposits will appear to be 
inefficient when deposits are taken as an output.   
When the directional technology distance function for each bank is estimated for a 
common directional vector, the sum of the directional distance functions is a measure of 
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industry performance. (Färe and Primont 2003, Färe and Grosskopf 2004)  In Table 3A, 
3B, and 3C we report the annual estimates of industry inefficiency and Figure 2 depicts 
this performance graphically for the directional vector ( , , )g x y b= .  Industry 
inefficiency before the Asian financial crisis increases, more than doubling from 1992 to 
1995 (except for Model 4), and then doubling again from 1995 to 1998 (except for Model 
5).  This increase in inefficiency might be partly explained by the fact that during the 
financial liberalization period before the crisis, the Korean government maintained an 
anti-merger policy.  As a consequence, inefficient banks that might have been acquired 
remained in business, diluting the market share of efficient banks.  After the crisis, 
industry inefficiency declines during 1998 to 1999 and declines even further in Models 3 
and 5 during 2000.  This decline in industry inefficiency is explained in part by the 
Korean government abandoning its anti-merger policy, which brought about an exodus of 
inefficient banks by closure and through mergers and acquisitions.  From 2000-2002, 
industry inefficiency rises for Models 1, 2, and 3, remains constant for Model 4, and 
declines for Model 5.  As expected, industry inefficiency for Model 3 is less than that 
estimated for Models 1 and 2 given the larger number of outputs in Model 3 relative to 
Models 1 and 2.   
Tables 4A, 4B, and 4C present the estimates of the components of industry 
productivity growth (L) and its decomposition into the sum of an efficiency change 
indicator (EFFCH) and a technical change indicator (TECH).  To interpret the results, we 
examine industry productivity growth during 1992-93 for Model 1, where productivity 
growth (L = 0.466) equals the sum of efficiency change (EFFCH = -0.047) and technical 
change (TECH = 0.513).   Efficiency change is negative, indicating a decline in 
efficiency from 1992 to 1993.  Multiplying EFFCH by the directional vector g, gives the 
  23
change in outputs and inputs for the period 1992 to 1993.  That is, 
, 
1 2 3
( , , )y y ydy EFFCHx g g g= ( )bdb EFFCHx g= , and 1 2 3( , ,x x xdx EFFCHx g g g )= .  For 
the directional vector  the decline in efficiency means the industry produces 
  
_ _ _
( , , )g x y b=
0.047 (43472,18882, 34939)dy x= (2043, 887,1642)=  fewer desirable outputs 
(commercial loans, personal loans, securities) and 0.047 7049 331db x= = more non-
performing loans, using  more inputs 
(labor, capital, deposits) than in 1992.  However, technical change is TECH=0.514, so the 
decline in efficiency is more than offset by gains in outputs and declines in non-
performing loans and input usage brought about by technical progress.  Therefore, by 
1993, more commercial loans, more personal loans, more securities, and fewer non-
performing loans are produced from fewer inputs than in 1992.     
0.047 (4094,6457,119851) (192,303,5633)dx x= =
In Figures 3, 4, and 5 we graph the components of industry productivity change.  
First, we note that by construction, our indicator of technical change is positive in each 
period.  Second, although industry efficiency frequently declines from period to period, 
those declines are offset by positive technical change.   In fact, the magnitude of the 
technical change indicator is such that with the exception of Model 5 during 1992-1995, 
Model 2 in 1999-2000, and Model 4 in 2000-2001, the Korean banking industry 
experienced productivity growth in every year, including the years of the Asian financial 
crisis.   
Given the importance of technical progress in driving productivity growth, how 
can we be sure that technical progress actually occurred?   In 1992 the Korean banking 
industry consisted of 24 banks.  If those 24 banks from 1992 were able to face the 2002 
production technology, how inefficient would they be relative to their inefficiency in 
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1992?  In Table 5 we present the number of banks in years prior to 2002 that would be 
deemed efficient for the 2002 technology.  For instance, for Model 1, 2, and 3 the 1992 
observations of outputs and inputs for eight, thirteen, and twenty-one banks would have 
been efficient relative to the 2002 technology.  For Models 4 and 5, the same analysis is 
true for only one and six banks.  It appears as if little technical change has occurred 
during the period.  However, only twelve banks from 1992 survived to 2002.  Moreover, 
the mix of outputs changed significantly from 1992 to 2002 with banks producing fewer 
commercial loans, more securities, and more personal loans in 2002 than in 1992.  
Beginning in 1993 and continuing to 1996, there is a sharp fall in the number of banks 
from previous periods that are still efficient in 2002.  After 1996, as the years progress 
and become closer to 2002, the number of banks that are efficient relative to the 2002 
technology tends to increase.  We also re-estimated each of the five models using the 
standard DEA method by assuming a technology in the current year that does not depend 
on prior years.  We find that in some years, notably 1997-98 and 1998-99, more than half 
of all the banks experienced technical regress.  Since the "blue-prints" were not likely lost 
but maybe only misplaced for a short while given the Asian financial crisis, we think that 
our newer method of incorporating prior year's data in constructing the current year's 
technology provides a better measure of technical progress from year to year.  
To further examine the issue of technical progress, we examine the distributions 
of inefficiencies of the 1992 observations of bank outputs and inputs relative to the 1992 
technology and relative to the 2002 technology.  Since our method is nonparametric, 
standard t-tests are not valid.  Instead, we use the T-test proposed by Li (1996) to 
evaluate the difference in two kernel distributions of inefficiency.  We estimate a 
standard normal kernel distribution following Pagan and Ullah (1999).  Let 
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1992
1992 1992 1992( ( , , ; , ,T x y b )f D x y b g g g
→
 represent the kernel distribution of 1992 
inefficiencies and let  represent the distribution of 
inefficiencies for the 1992 observations relative to the 2002 frontier technology.  We 
wish to test whether .  No technical progress occurs if we find that the two 
distribution functions of inefficiencies are equal.  On the other hand, if the distribution of 
inefficiencies for 1992 lies to the left of the distribution of inefficiencies if the banks 
faced the 2002 technology, then it is a greater distance from the 1992 observations to the 
2002 frontier than it is from the 1992 observations to the 1992 frontier.  This finding 
would indicate technical progress.  For each model, we provide Li's statistic for 
differences in the two distributions in Table 5 (critical T=1.71 for α=.05 and a one-tail 
test).  The test results indicate technical progress during the period for Models 1, 2, and 5.  
By the year 2002, only fourteen banks remained in the Korean banking industry.  We 
perform a similar kernel distribution test for these banks to test the hypothesis whether or 
not
2002
1992 1992 1992( ( , , ; , ,T x y bg D x y b g g g
→
)
T x y b
(.) (.)f g=
1992
2002 2002 2002( ( , , ; , , )f D x y b g g g
→ 2002
2002 2002 2002( ( , , ; , , )T x y bg D x y b g g g
→
)
= .  If 
technical progress occurs, then we would expect the 2002 observations to lie outside the 
1992 frontier with <0 for the fourteen banks.  Except for 
Model 3, our tests reject the null hypothesis of no technical progress.     
1992
2002 2002 2002( , , ; , ,T x y bD x y b g g g
→
Our productivity estimates indicate that technical progress was strong enough 
during the period to offset declines in efficiency.  That is, the frontiers of the sets V(b) 
and P(x) have been pushed to the northwest, and the frontier of the set L(y) has been 
pushed to the southwest in Figure 1.  Our results indicate that the bank reforms of the 
1990s and early 2000s were successful in generating productivity growth.  While all the 
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banks experience technical progress during the period, most banks fail to keep up with 
the pacesetting banks, resulting in greater inefficiency.  Our results are also consistent 
with accounting measures of profitability, such as return on equity (ROE) and return on 
assets (ROA).  The ROE of Korean banks is 6.7% in 1992 and declines to 3.8% in 1996.  
By 1997, ROE is negative and reaches a low of -53% in 1998.  During 1999 and 2000 
ROE remains negative, but losses narrow.  By 2001 and 2002 ROE recovers to 16% and 
11.7%.  A similar pattern is seen with ROA.   
6. Conclusions 
 In 1997-1998 the Asian economies experienced a financial crisis and contagion 
brought on by lax regulatory oversight, government-subsidized lending, moral hazard, 
and global financial integration.  In Korea, the financial crisis was preceded by 
government deregulation and privatization of banks and in its wake, by re-regulation, 
restructuring, government and foreign equity capital injections, and a refocusing on bank 
efficiency and profitability.    
In this paper we examine the efficiency and productivity growth of Korean banks 
during the period 1992-2002.  We measure efficiency and productivity change using the 
directional technology distance function.  This distance function allows us to aggregate 
individual bank efficiency and productivity indicators to the industry level and control for 
non-performing loans, which are an undesirable by-product of the loan production 
process.  Furthermore, in measuring productivity change, we propose a technology that 
depends on past period outcomes as well as current period outcomes.  As a consequence 
of our method, declines in productivity are assigned as declines in efficiency, rather than 
technological regress.  We find that in the years before the Asian financial crisis, 
inefficiency in the Korean banking industry increased dramatically.  Although the 
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banking industry became less efficient throughout the period, technical progress more 
than offset declines in efficiency.   During 1992-2002 the banking industry experienced 
productivity growth, brought about primarily by technical progress. 
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Appendix:  List of Korean Commercial Banks 
 
Nationwide Banks  
 
1.  Cho Hung Bank 
2.  Commercial Bank of Korea (merged to form Hanvit Bank in 1999)   
3.  Korea First Bank (nationalized in 1998) 
4.  Hanil Bank (merged to form Hanvit Bank in 1999)   
5.  Bank of Seoul (nationalized in 1998) 
6.  Korea Exchange Bank 
7.  Shinhan Bank 
8.  Hanmi Bank (KorAm Bank) 
9.  Dongwha Bank (acquired by Shinhan in 1998) 
10.  Dongnam Bank (acquired by Housing and Commercial Bank in 1998) 
11.  Daedong Bank (acquired by Kookmin Bank in 1998) 
12.  Hana Bank 
13.  Boram Bank (merged into Hana bank in 1999) 
14.  Peace Bank (merged into Woori Holding Co. in 2001) 
15.  Kookmin Bank (converted from a special bank in 1995) 
16.  Housing and Commercial Bank (converted from a special bank in 1997 and      
merged into Kookmin Bank in 2001) 
17.  Woori Holding Co. (former Hanvit Bank renamed in 2002 when it became a 
financial holding company) 
 
Regional Banks  
 
1.   Daegu Bank 
2.   Pusan Bank   
3.   Chung Chong Bank (acquired by Hana Bank in 1998) 
4.   Kwangju Bank 
5.   Bank of Cheju  
6.   Kyungki Bank (acquired by Hanmi Bnk in 1998) 
7.   Jeonbuk Bank 
8.   Kangwon Bank (merged into Cho Hung Bank in 1999) 
9.   Kyungnam Bank 
10.  Choongbuk Bank (merged into Cho Hung Bank in 1999) 
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 Table 1.  Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Mean1 Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Commercial Loans (y1) 43472 48636 377 359634 
Personal Loans (y2) 18882 41673 294 354823 
Securities (y3) 34939 44350 1437 293702 
Demand deposits (y4) 13038 14955 775 114228 
Total loans less non-
performing loans 
(y5=y1+y2-b1) 
55305 82654 658 692390 
Deposits (y6) 119851 151228 4241 1151634 
Interest income (y7) 11745 13273 211 91752 
Non-interest income (y8) 5171 7576 1 49939 
Fee income (y9) 946 1182 0 8139 
Non-performing loans(b1)2 7049 9019 12 54888 
Labor 4094 3568 254 19194 
Physical capital (x2) 6457 6344 329 35381 
Deposits (x3) 119851 151228 4241 1151634 
Interest expense (x4) 8589 9455 36 55740 
Non-interest expense (x5) 8848 12380 175 78791 
equity (eq) 9145 10461 431 88385 
Notes: 
1. The year and number of included banks are:  1992-24, 1993-24, 1994-24, 1995-
25, 1996-25, 1997-26, 1998-18, 1999-17, 2000-17, 2001-15, 2002-14 for a total 
of 229 observations.  Labor equals the number of workers, and all other variables 
are measured in 100 million Korean won. 
2. Two newly formed banks in 1999 and four newly formed banks in 2001 reported 
zero amounts of non-performing loans in their first year of operation and were not 
included in that year, but were included in subsequent years.   
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Table 2.  Number of National Banks (N) and Regional Banks (R) on the Frontier.   
Frontier banks have ( , , ; , , ) 0T x y bD x y b g g g
→ =  
 
Year 
Total  
=N+R 
 
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
 
Model 4 
 
Model 5 
1992 24=14+10 19=10+9 19=10+9 22=12+10 9=7+2 8=4+4 
1993 24=14+10 17=9+8 18=9+9 17=9+8 7=6+1 4=1+3 
1994 24=14+10 15=8+7 18=10+8 19=10+9 9=6+3 4=2+2 
1995 25=15+10 11=6+5 12=7+5 15=9+6 8=6+2 3=3+0 
1996 25=15+10 10=7+3 10=7+3 14=9+5 7=5+2 4=2+2 
1997 26=16+10 12=6+6 14=7+7 15=8+7 5=4+1 10=8+2 
1998 18=12+6 7=7+0 9=9+0 11=9+2 6=6+0 8=7+1 
1999 17=11+6 14=11+3 13=10+3 15=10+5 7=6+1 4=3+1 
2000 17=11+6 12=8+4 13=0+4 15=11+4 6=5+1 5=4+1 
2001 15=9+6 10=5+5 11=6+5 13=8+5 3=3+0 3=2+1 
2002 14=8+6 8=4+4 9=5+4 11=7+4 3=3+0 5=2+3 
 
Each model takes  and includes the equity capital constraint 
_ _ _
( , , )g x y b=
Outputs-y1=Commercial loans, y2=personal loans, y3=securities investments, y4=demand 
deposits, y5=total loans less non-performing loans (y1+y2-b1), y6=total deposits, 
y7=interest income, y8=non-interest income, y9=fee income, b1=non-performing loans. 
 
Inputs-x1=full-time workers, x2=physical capital, x3=total deposits, x4=interest expense, 
x5=non-interest expense. 
 
Model 1.  outputs=(y1,y2,y3,b1),          inputs=(x1,x2,x3) 
Model 2-  outputs=(y1,y2,y3,y9,b1) ,    inputs=(x1,x2,x3) 
Model 3.  outputs=(y1,y2,y3,y4,y9,b1), inputs=(x1,x2,x3) 
Model 4.  outputs=(y3,y5,y6,y9),          inputs=(x1,x2) 
Model 5.  outputs=(y7,y8),                  inputs=(x4,x5) 
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Table 3A. Industry Efficiency:  
1
( , , ; , , )
kK
k k k
T x y b
k
D x y b g g g
→
=
∑
 
Year K Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
1992 24 0.0434 0.0392 0.0040 0.5925 0.1602 
1993 24 0.0904 0.0751 0.0687 0.6220 0.4123 
1994 24 0.2572 0.0699 0.0572 0.5415 0.4801 
1995 25 0.4418 0.2183 0.1418 0.6261 0.5516 
1996 25 0.6258 0.6299 0.4624 1.0119 0.4739 
1997 26 1.1390 0.5718 0.5212 1.3741 0.6119 
1998 18 1.3474 0.8651 0.5282 1.9150 1.0198 
1999 17 0.2418 0.0493 0.0302 1.5667 0.8156 
2000 17 0.4615 0.3071 0.0237 1.9359 0.6966 
2001 15 0.8006 0.4749 0.1594 3.0931 0.4300 
2002 14 1.5389 0.8228 0.1083 1.9379 0.3232 
 
Each model takes  and includes the equity capital constraint 
_ _ _
( , , )g x y b=
Outputs-y1=Commercial loans, y2=personal loans, y3=securities investments, y4=demand 
deposits, y5=total loans less non-performing loans(y1+y2-b1), y6=total deposits, 
y7=interest income, y8=non-interest income, y9=fee income, b1=non-performing loans. 
 
Inputs-x1=full-time workers, x2=physical capital, x3=total deposits, x4=interest expense, 
x5=non-interest expense. 
 
Model 1. outputs=(y1,y2,y3,b1),          inputs=(x1,x2,x3) 
Model 2.  outputs=(y1,y2,y3,y9,b1) ,    inputs=(x1,x2,x3) 
Model 3.  outputs=(y1,y2,y3,y4,y9,b1), inputs=(x1,x2,x3) 
Model 4.  outputs=(y3,y5,y6,y9),          inputs=(x1,x2) 
Model 5.  outputs=(y7,y8),                  inputs=(x4,x5)  
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Table 3B.  Industry Inefficiency: , 
1
( , , ; , , )
kK
k k k
T x y b
k
D x y b g g g
→
=
∑ ( , , ) (0, , )x y bg g g g y b= =  
 
Year Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
1992 0.0891 0.0396 0.0052 0.8306 0.3727 
1993 0.1394 0.108 0.0826 0.8992 0.8561 
1994 0.4316 0.1021 0.0932 0.8174 0.9559 
1995 0.7325 0.5341 0.3844 0.9517 1.1823 
1996 1.4552 1.0297 0.8417 1.7884 1.0527 
1997 2.4211 0.8545 0.7819 2.5529 1.1587 
1998 3.1274 1.6748 1.086 4.3569 1.9213 
1999 0.3026 0.1011 0.0674 3.6032 1.6126 
2000 1.1877 0.6133 0.0403 4.3043 1.3579 
2001 1.8247 0.9569 0.2111 8.3811 0.8869 
2002 2.8233 1.8255 0.1632 5.6594 0.7029 
Each model takes ( , , ) (0, , )x y bg g g g y b= =  and includes the equity capital constraint 
 
Outputs-y1=Commercial loans, y2=personal loans, y3=securities investments, y4=demand 
deposits, y5=total loans less non-performing loans(y1+y2-b1), y6=total deposits, 
y7=interest income, y8=non-interest income, y9=fee income, b1=non-performing loans. 
 
Inputs-x1=full-time workers, x2=physical capital, x3=total deposits, x4=interest expense, 
x5=non-interest expense. 
 
Model 1. outputs=(y1,y2,y3,b1),          inputs=(x1,x2,x3) 
Model 2.  outputs=(y1,y2,y3,y9,b1) ,    inputs=(x1,x2,x3) 
Model 3.  outputs=(y1,y2,y3,y4,y9,b1), inputs=(x1,x2,x3) 
Model 4.  outputs=(y3,y5,y6,y9),          inputs=(x1,x2) 
Model 5.  outputs=(y7,y8),                  inputs=(x4,x5)  
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Table 3C. Industry Inefficiency:   
1
( , , ; , , )
kK
k k k
T x y b
k
D x y b g g g
→
=
∑ ( , , ) ( ,0,0)x y bg g g g x= =  
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
1992 0.2348 0.1763 0.0128 1.5211 0.2746 
1993 0.2213 0.2028 0.1762 1.5407 0.7740 
1994 0.2026 0.1778 0.1431 1.3449 0.9202 
1995 0.8964 0.7150 0.4489 1.6416 1.0218 
1996 1.5679 1.3351 1.0253 2.3691 0.8628 
1997 3.1394 2.3307 2.2946 3.7336 1.2906 
1998 2.2276 1.3689 0.8300 3.5357 2.1564 
1999 0.1046 0.1046 0.0624 2.3463 1.6428 
2000 0.6154 0.4607 0.0508 3.5024 1.4302 
2001 1.5494 0.6010 0.3553 4.7789 0.8362 
2002 1.7658 1.1716 0.2182 2.8291 0.5937 
 
Outputs-y1=Commercial loans, y2=personal loans, y3=securities investments, y4=demand 
deposits, y5=total loans less non-performing loans(y1+y2-b1), y6=total deposits, 
y7=interest income, y8=non-interest income, y9=fee income, b1=non-performing loans. 
 
Inputs-x1=full-time workers, x2=physical capital, x3=total deposits, x4=interest expense, 
x5=non-interest expense. 
 
Model 1. outputs=(y1,y2,y3,b1),          inputs=(x1,x2,x3) 
Model 2.  outputs=(y1,y2,y3,y9,b1) ,    inputs=(x1,x2,x3) 
Model 3.  outputs=(y1,y2,y3,y4,y9,b1), inputs=(x1,x2,x3) 
Model 4.  outputs=(y3,y5,y6,y9),          inputs=(x1,x2) 
Model 5.  outputs=(y7,y8),                  inputs=(x4,x5) 
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Table 4A. Decomposition of the Industry Productivity Indicator 
L=productivity indicator, EFFCH =efficiency change indicator,  
TECH=technical change indicator 
 
Years  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
1992-93 L= 0.4664 0.4180 0.2209 0.3871 -0.2211 
 EFFCH+ -0.0470 -0.0359 -0.0647 -0.0295 -0.2521 
 TECH 0.5134 0.4539 0.2856 0.4166 0.0311 
1993-94 L= 0.9700 0.7476 0.6795 1.2165 -0.0369 
 EFFCH+ -0.1668 0.0052 0.0115 0.0805 -0.0678 
 TECH 1.1368 0.7424 0.6680 1.1360 0.0310 
1994-95 L= 0.3521 0.1519 0.1460 0.4082 -0.0051 
 EFFCH+ -0.1846 -0.1484 -0.0846 -0.0846 -0.0715 
 TECH 0.5367 0.3003 0.2306 0.4928 0.0665 
1995-96 L= 1.1203 1.0559 0.1248 1.1530 0.0945 
 EFFCH+ -0.1840 -0.4116 -0.3206 -0.3858 0.0777 
 TECH 1.3043 1.4675 0.4454 1.5388 0.0168 
1996-97 L= 4.1105 0.9604 2.8313 2.3146 5.1052 
 EFFCH+ -0.2878 0.1068 -0.0101 -0.1334 -0.1380 
 TECH 4.3983 0.8536 2.8414 2.4480 5.2432 
1997-98 L= 2.9569 0.4788 1.0403 3.6172 3.1475 
 EFFCH+ -0.3173 -0.4257 -0.1315 -0.8891 -0.4885 
 TECH 3.2742 0.9045 1.1718 4.5063 3.6360 
1998-99 L= 2.3757 1.1465 0.7974 1.1287 0.3250 
 EFFCH+ 0.5974 0.3484 0.2783 -0.1688 -0.2382 
 TECH 1.7783 0.7981 0.5191 1.2975 0.5632 
1999-00 L= 2.0175 -0.1141 0.2469 1.7581 0.2337 
 EFFCH+ -0.2197 -0.2578 0.0065 -0.3692 0.1190 
 TECH 2.2372 0.1437 0.2404 2.1273 0.1147 
2000-01 L= 2.5791 0.1993 0.4722 -0.0789 0.4749 
 EFFCH+ -0.3391 -0.1678 -0.1357 -1.2242 0.2666 
 TECH 2.9182 0.3671 0.6079 1.1453 0.2083 
2001-02 L= 2.5392 1.1761 0.8790 1.5212 0.4057 
 EFFCH+ -0.7383 -0.3479 0.0511 0.9320 0.0850 
 TECH 3.2775 1.5240 0.8279 0.5892 0.3207 
Each model takes  and includes the equity capital constraint 
_ _ _
( , , )g x y b=
Outputs-y1=Commercial loans, y2=personal loans, y3=securities investments, y4=demand 
deposits, y5=total loans less non-performing loans(y1+y2-b1), y6=total deposits, 
y7=interest income, y8=non-interest income, y9=fee income, b1=non-performing loans. 
Inputs-x1=full-time workers, x2=physical capital, x3=total deposits, x4=interest expense, 
x5=non-interest expense. 
Model 1.  outputs=(y1,y2,y3,b1),          inputs=(x1,x2,x3) 
Model 2.  outputs=(y1,y2,y3,y9,b1) ,    inputs=(x1,x2,x3) 
Model 3.  outputs=(y1,y2,y3,y4,y9,b1), inputs=(x1,x2,x3) 
Model 4.  outputs=(y3,y5,y6,y9),          inputs=(x1,x2) 
Model 5.  outputs=(y7,y8),                  inputs=(x4,x5) 
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Table 4B. Industry Productivity Change for ( , , ) (0, , )x y bg g g g y b= =  
 
Year  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
L 0.6466 0.5712 0.5426 0.5168 -0.4098 
EFFCH -0.0503 -0.0684 -0.0774 -0.0686 -0.4834 
 
1992-93 
TECH 0.6969 0.6396 0.6200 0.5854 0.0736 
L 1.3639 2.1921 2.2612 1.5248 -0.0297 
EFFCH -0.2922 0.0059 -0.0106 0.0818 -0.0998 
 
1993-94 
TECH 1.6561 2.1862 2.2718 1.4430 0.0701 
L 0.4496 0.2393 0.4632 0.6118 -0.0227 
EFFCH -0.3009 -0.4320 -0.2912 -0.1343 -0.2264 
 
1994-95 
TECH 0.7505 0.6713 0.7544 0.7461 0.2037 
L 3.3867 3.5049 2.9440 1.6608 0.1554 
EFFCH -0.7227 -0.4956 -0.4573 -0.8367 0.1296 
 
1995-96 
TECH 4.1094 4.0005 3.4013 2.4975 0.0258 
L 16.4065 5.3650 4.0474 2.9413 5.4460 
EFFCH -0.7405 0.2239 0.1085 -0.3613 -0.1060 
 
1996-97 
TECH 17.1470 5.1411 3.9389 3.3026 5.5520 
L 9.6528 18.7525 4.5991 5.2917 3.2049 
EFFCH -0.9687 -1.0562 -0.5242 -2.3662 -0.9136 
 
1997-98 
TECH 10.6215 19.8087 5.1233 7.6579 4.1185 
L 5.1561 12.5206 -5.7888 2.1883 0.8398 
EFFCH 1.5999 0.6123 0.4907 -0.6584 -0.5172 
 
1998-99 
TECH 3.5562 11.9083 -6.2795 2.8467 1.3570 
L 4.7283 4.7165 1.2257 4.0935 0.4910 
EFFCH -0.8851 -0.5122 0.0271 -0.7011 0.2547 
 
1999-00 
TECH 5.6134 5.2287 1.1986 4.7946 0.2363 
L 8.9562 9.6685 8.9480 -1.1332 0.9136 
EFFCH -0.6370 -0.3436 -0.1708 -4.3243 0.4710 
 
2000-01 
TECH 9.5932 10.0121 9.1188 3.1912 0.4426 
L 7.5942 8.6655 11.4210 3.7210 0.8227 
EFFCH -0.9986 -0.8686 0.0479 2.2801 0.1420 
 
2001-02 
TECH 8.5928 9.5341 11.3731 1.4409 0.6807 
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Table 4C. Industry Productivity Change for ( , , ) ( ,0,0)x y bg g g g x= =  
 
Year  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
L 2.6752 3.7200 2.0899 1.0056 -0.4442 
EFFCH 0.0135 -0.0265 -0.1634 -0.0196 -0.4994 
 
1992-93 
TECH 2.6617 3.7465 2.2533 1.0252 0.0553 
L 3.5494 7.6438 5.1135 4.8474 -0.0923 
EFFCH 0.0187 0.0250 0.0331 0.1958 -0.1462 
 
1993-94 
TECH 3.5307 7.6188 5.0804 4.6516 0.0539 
L 0.2159 0.9714 0.6973 2.1374 -0.0265 
EFFCH -0.6938 -0.5372 -0.3058 -0.2967 -0.1016 
 
1994-95 
TECH 0.9097 1.5086 1.0031 2.4341 0.0751 
L 4.8750 5.1777 5.0680 4.2729 0.0941 
EFFCH -0.6715 -0.6201 -0.5764 -0.7275 0.1590 
 
1995-96 
TECH 5.5465 5.7978 5.6444 5.0004 -0.0650 
L 4.5503 108.5506 30.5942 8.7087 0.3993 
EFFCH -0.4336 -0.0160 -0.2897 -0.8357 -0.4278 
 
1996-97 
TECH 4.9839 108.5666 30.8839 9.5444 0.8271 
L 4.2523 15.3593 78.4064 6.7250 0.0631 
EFFCH 0.6660 0.7217 1.2326 -0.7121 -1.0396 
 
1997-98 
TECH 3.5863 14.6376 77.1738 7.4371 1.1027 
L 3.9700 4.2045 4.0237 2.4334 0.6541 
EFFCH 1.3375 0.5955 0.4051 0.2787 -0.4242 
 
1998-99 
TECH 2.6325 3.6090 3.6186 2.1547 1.0783 
L 6.4828 14.1977 15.5191 2.8887 0.4421 
EFFCH -0.5108 -0.3561 0.0116 -1.1561 0.2126 
 
1999-00 
TECH 6.9936 14.5538 15.5075 4.0448 0.2295 
L 12.5498 -64.4835 1.5342 0.4178 0.9888 
EFFCH -0.9340 -0.1403 -0.3045 -1.4175 0.5940 
 
2000-01 
TECH 13.4838 -64.3432 1.8387 1.8353 0.3948 
L 6.0849 10.0952 12.6398 2.6725 0.7994 
EFFCH -0.2164 -0.5706 0.1371 1.5571 0.1972 
 
2001-02 
TECH 6.3013 10.6658 12.5027 1.1154 0.6022 
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Table 5-Number of frontier banks from previous periods that would be efficient for the 
2002 technology and tests for technical change 
 
Previous 
period 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
1992 8 13 21 1 6 
1993 2 6 7 0 1 
1994 1 6 7 0 2 
1995 2 3 4 0 1 
1996 2 2 5 0 1 
1997 6 9 10 1 1 
1998 6 9 9 6 5 
1999 6 10 12 3 2 
2000 8 11 12 5 3 
2001 10 11 12 3 3 
2002 8 9 11 3 5 
Is 
2002
1992 1992 1992( ( , , ; , , )Tf D x y b x y b
→
=
2002
1992 1992 1992( ( , , ; , ,Tg D x y b x y b
→
)  
T-value1 8.32 5.90 0.15 24.31 0.32 
Is 
1992
2002 2002 2002( ( , , ; , , )Tf D x y b x y b
→ 2002
2002 2002 2002( ( , , ; , , )Tg D x y b x y b
→
=  
T-value1 4,59 3.88 1.64 4.48 2.46 
 
1. Based on Qi Li's (1996) T-test.  Critical T=1.71, α=.05 
Each model takes  and includes the equity capital constraint 
_ _ _
( , , )g x y b=
Outputs-y1=Commercial loans, y2=personal loans, y3=securities investments, y4=demand 
deposits, y5=total loans less non-performing loans (y1+y2-b1), y6=total deposits, 
y7=interest income, y8=non-interest income, y9=fee income, b1=non-performing loans. 
Inputs-x1=full-time workers, x2=physical capital, x3=total deposits, x4=interest expense, 
x5=non-interest expense. 
Model 1.  outputs=(y1,y2,y3,b1),          inputs=(x1,x2,x3) 
Model 2.  outputs=(y1,y2,y3,y9,b1) ,    inputs=(x1,x2,x3) 
Model 3.  outputs=(y1,y2,y3,y4,y9,b1), inputs=(x1,x2,x3) 
Model 4.  outputs=(y3,y5,y6,y9),          inputs=(x1,x2) 
Model 5.  outputs=(y7,y8),                  inputs=(x4,x5) 
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Figure 1.  The Directional Technology Distance Function 
y y
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Figure 3-Industry Efficiency Change
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Figure 4-Industry Technical Change 
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Figure 5-Industry Productivity Change
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